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A B S T R A C T
This paper investigates gendered patterns of corruption and access to illicit
networks among female cross-border traders near the Senegambian border.
Despite a discourse of generosity and solidarity, access to corrupt networks
is mediated by class and gender, furthering social differentiation, especially
insofar as it depends on geographic and socio-economic affinity with
customs officers, state representatives and well-connected transporters. Issues
of organisational culture, occupational identity and interpersonal negotiations
of power represent important sources of corruption that require an under-
standing of the actual dynamics of public administration. While smuggling
depends on contesting legal and social boundaries, the most successful
traders (and transporters) strive to fulfil ideal gender roles as closely as
possible. Ironically, trading on poverty and feminine vulnerability only works for
relatively affluent women.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Through the paths of the most confusing and most crooked furrows in
the depths of the Saloum, travelling at night, are a group of anxious and
nervous women. They vie with one another in self-sacrifice and engage
their ‘cousins’ of the customs service in a hellish game of hide and seek.
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These are the ‘Ndioganes’. Of all ages, they are engaged in smuggling
goods from Farafenni, Gambia. Customs officers call this activity fraud by
infiltration.
(Cissé )
The cross-border traders known widely in Senegal as ndioganes are
women smuggling everyday commodities from The Gambia (sugar,
tomato concentrate, batteries, fabric and cooking oil). Some head-load
small quantities several times a day between remote periodic markets
(loumas) and rarely encounter customs officers. Others depend on horse
and cart drivers who specialise in smuggling, experienced in customs
evasion and the art of the high-speed chase. For them, corruption
occasionally results from encounters with officers who accept bribes
or negotiate with smugglers on an ad hoc basis, particularly if some
personal relationship is identified. But the most successful traders
benefit from repeated contact with taxi drivers and customs officers,
in which the quantity of smuggled goods and the relevant bribes are
negotiated in advance with some predictability. Individual traders
may negotiate directly with officers at the border or mobilise personal
ties to officers. Alternatively, groups of women can develop strategies
with transporters, who serve as intermediaries negotiating collective
bribes near the official border point. These ties between kin, colleagues
and acquaintances allow some women to benefit from cooperation with
state representatives in order to circumvent the law. For this reason, I use
the term ‘illicit networks’ to investigate social networks that serve to
further opportunities for illicit accumulation (smuggling and corrup-
tion). The cooperative smuggling strategies involving rural women
are quite distinct from the famously powerful and structured marabout
networks in the holy city of Touba (for which, see Bako-Arifari ;
Coulon ), but they are nonetheless important to rural economies.
Moreover, the social regulation of networks for petty corruption
provides insight into the poorly understood realities of public authority
and the everyday corruption that pervades daily life in many developing
countries (see Blundo et al. ).
Efforts to stem the tide of corruption are central to the good
governance paradigm. The World Bank (: ) has suggested ‘that
policies promoting gender equality can help clean up governments and
business’, and that ‘female participation in the public domain – can
strengthen a country’s governance and the effectiveness of its develop-
ment policy. The world cannot forgo salutary effects as remarkable
as these’ (ibid. ). To the extent that women’s moral virtue can further
 C Y N T H I A H O W S O N
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such efforts, the goals of anti-corruption and gender equity can be seen
as complementary. However, the literature that posits a link between
gender and corruption ignores critical analytical questions, including
the possibility that corruption impacts men and women differently,
and that gender mediates access to opportunities for corrupt accumu-
lation (see also Goetz ). Instead, this literature relates to findings
regarding the tendency of women to be more averse to corrupt practice
than men (two cross-national statistical studies, Dollar et al. ,
Swamy et al. , are widely cited). This is used almost solely to debate
the instrumentalist potential of including more women in public
office, while failing to elucidate the practical dynamics of corruption.
This paper addresses this gap by investigating the gendered dynamics
of illicit networks among women cross-border traders in Senegal and
the men who facilitate or hinder their efforts. The moral regulation
of these networks intersects with ‘practical norms’ of organisation in
the transport sector and customs apparatus in a context of increasingly
restricted state resources. These processes shape what Olivier de Sardan
() calls ‘real governance’. Successful law-avoidance for everyone
involved requires a delicate strategy of fulfilling occupational obli-
gations, ideal moral and gendered boundaries, as well as representing
specific class identities. Preliminary evidence suggests that the moral
regulation of illicit networks does constrain women in important
ways, but that this is likely to result more from the social importance of
women’s reputation among men than from women’s own moral values.
Data and analysis are based on twelve months of fieldwork, from 
to , including an in-depth survey with one hundred traders, as well
as focus groups near loumas (periodic markets) and life histories. This is
complemented by interviews with customs officers, transporters, market
managers and traditional as well as government authority figures who
constitute the illicit networks for women’s smuggling and regulate their
access. As Goetz () points out, to the extent that women are less
likely than men to participate in corrupt activity, it is crucial to consider
how much this is determined by women’s limited opportunities,
particularly because the effect may be diminished as women gain access
to public resources. If women presented with opportunities to engage
in corruption are actually less inclined to do so, a greater understanding
of patterns of corruption would require considering why women
behave differently from men in response to specific political contexts,
as opposed to simply theoretical claims about gender roles and
norms. The problem with persistent assumptions either that women
are inherently less corrupt than men or that they necessarily respond to
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
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opportunities for corruption in ways that are identical to men
(cf. Alhassan-Alolo ; Sung ; Vijayalakshmi ) is that there
is very little space for understanding actual patterns of corruption.
A more nuanced approach would attempt to disentangle the dynamics
of gender norms and their intersection with norms associated with the
exercise of public authority, thereby elucidating actual patterns of access
and responses to illicit networks.
The practical dynamics of rural law enforcement and public
administration embody public authority and traders’ conception of the
state. As Lund (: ) put it, the ‘idea of the state is formed as
a combination of people’s everyday encounters with representatives’.
Conflicting but symbiotic relationships between traders, transporters
and officers mean that individual relationships are in a constant state
of flux between contestation, competition, negotiation and cooperation.
Meanwhile, the assumption that corruption and smuggling reflect a
neatly defined illegality is reflected in the tendency to place both in
a discourse of criminalisation. Thus, in a document for the World Bank,
Ferreira et al. (: ) write:
customs must endeavour to prevent the importation of illegal goods.
Smuggling of drugs and weapons, plus large-scale smuggling of alcohol and
cigarettes, places customs directly into the vortex of organized crime – with
criminals using any means, from extensive bribery to intimidation and
violence, to promote their illegal transactions.
That alcohol and cigarettes qualify as illegal goods in this assessment is
further evidence that the authors make no effort to distinguish between
different sources and techniques of corruption. Because illegal cross-
border trade in West Africa tends towards trade in legal goods, the
failure to distinguish different forms of smuggling in this context,
though consistent with the notion of rule of law, is limited in its capacity
to understand not only patterns of illegal behaviour, but patterns of
economic activity as well. ‘Indeed, the entire criminalisation thesis rests
on a refusal to raise relevant analytical questions about the distinction
between indigenous trading networks and organised crime’ (Meagher
).
The relationships between customs officers and their civilian inter-
mediaries, traders and transporters can be described as networks
of illicit earnings, but do not reflect a clean dichotomy between
legality and illegality. One may argue that this is simply evidence
of ‘bad governance’, but it seems difficult to argue that a strategy of
anti-corruption does not need to consider the practical dynamics
of competing norms. For example, Lund (: ) argues that
 C Y N T H I A H O W S O N
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 09 Jan 2013 IP address: 128.95.104.109
legitimacy can be claimed by non-state institutional authorities, and that
there may be ‘a fine line between a fee and a bribe for issuing a deed or
certificate, and between collecting a market-place tax and running a
protection racket’. Similarly, Olivier de Sardan () emphasises the
notion of ‘practical norms’, which regulate professional behaviour at the
interstices of official regulation and social norms. He argues that much
informal regulation is not deeply rooted in tradition, moral values or
culture, but is developed in response to changing circumstances. In
Uganda, Titeca & De Herdt (: ) argue that practical norms help
to ‘make sense of the divergence between official laws and regulations
and actually enforced practices’, noting that the ‘practices of govern-
ment officials are also profoundly influenced by social norms and
perceptions of the state held by illegal traders and transporters’. In
Malawi, Anders (: ) argues that reforms associated with ‘good
governance’ and the ‘combat against corruption’ did little more than
add ‘an extra layer to legal pluralism within the civil service in Malawi’.
The claim to universality inherent in concepts of governance and the
rule of law is problematic for a variety of reasons. If competing
norms limiting the relevance and predictability of statutory law are
simply seen as evidence of a policy or a state’s success or failure, there
is little space for understanding the actual dynamics of state manage-
ment. Meanwhile, studies that consider the actual dynamics of
corruption consistently cite the importance of competing norms in
promoting corrupt behaviour (see, for example, Anders , ;
Blundo ; Blundo et al. ; Olivier de Sardan ). Efforts to
describe regulation in African contexts are associated with references
to ‘real governance’ (Olivier de Sardan ), ‘institutional multiplicity’
(Hesselbein et al. ), ‘legal pluralism’ (Anders ), ‘institutional
bricolage’ (Cleaver ), and ‘twilight institutions’, which ‘effectively
exercise public authority’ outside the confines of the state (Lund :
).
Patterns of negotiation and corruption in this study contrast with
popular assumptions about governance and the rule of law. The second
section discusses critical debates surrounding gendered aspects of
corruption, which continue to focus on the hypothesis that women are
less corrupt than men. The next section analyses the role of masculinity
encountered during fieldwork, connecting the practical importance of
state capacity to notions of generosity, reciprocity and gendered
obligation among officers and transporters. The final section illustrates
the way in which competing norms are negotiated to structure and
facilitate access to illicit networks for traders, linking ideals of femininity
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
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to questions of reputation, sexuality, feminine sacrifice and vulnerability.
Each of these norms is mediated by class and other power relations,
which help to explain instances in which men and women are able to
deviate from ideal gender roles. My findings are broadly complemented
by the few ethnographic studies of corruption, but far removed from
donors’ conceptions of ‘governance’.
D E B A T E S O N C O R R U P T I O N , G O V E R N A N C E A N D G E N D E R
A possible factor in women’s limited involvement in corrupt activities is
their exclusion from or more limited access to corrupt networks, a point
made originally by Swamy et al. (). Goetz (: ) argues that
access to corrupt networks may be the key determinant of differences
in behaviour, although she is careful to note ‘the lack of research on how
gender mediates access to networks for illicit earning, let alone the lack
of explicit documentation about how such networks function’. There is
some evidence illustrating how women’s opportunities in illicit networks
might be constrained, while the social pressure to engage in corruption
may be more binding for men than women. Furthermore, some
networks may become gendered as a consequence of practical norms.
For Fassin (), the ways in which illicit networks are gendered play
a critical role in determining access, but not all networks are gendered
in the same way. The ability to trade in illicit pharmaceuticals near Dakar
was typically controlled by the Mouride network, recruiting men who
had been apprentices in the holy city of Touba. For this reason, illegal
medicines in Pikine were never sold by women, except in tiny quantities.
In Kaolack central market, on the other hand, the illicit trade in
pharmaceuticals and bleaching cosmetics was almost entirely controlled
by women. For Fassin (: ), ‘variations by sex originate in
differences in recruitment and in the composition of networks’. Here,
access may be gendered as much by practical norms as by gendered
social norms.
Olivier de Sardan (: ) notes that social obligation is not only a
function of solidarity, but is also connected to shame, a distinctly social
morality. A civil servant who refused to engage in any form of corruption
would be subject to ‘the shame that would inevitably befall his relatives,
and which could be interpreted as his pride, his scorn for others, his lack
of compassion, his rejection of family or friends, his hostility toward
social norms’. The use of the masculine subject in this observation does
not solely reflect the traditional universality of the masculine pronoun
or the predominance of men in the civil service. Rather, as I argue in the
 C Y N T H I A H O W S O N
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next section, this precise representation of shame among civil servants is
distinctly, if not uniquely, masculine. Meanwhile, women’s involvement
in these opportunities can include a balancing act that must be carefully
managed. Smith () describes a typical story of a small government
contract in Nigeria. A secretary in a local government office convinced
her boss to provide her husband with a contract to build a fence at
the primary school, a form of corruption that is reminiscent of Anders’
() descriptions of civil servants’ sense of moral obligation towards
their secretaries. The favour was granted, greatly benefiting the family,
while the village was grateful to receive some (albeit small) funding for
its school. Nonetheless, the cost of the opportunity included disparaging
rumours of a sexual relationship between the secretary and her boss.
There are very few empirical accounts of the ways in which pressures
facing civil servants may be distinctly gendered. Although Selboe ()
provides an illuminating account of the dynamics of network politics in
Dakar, she does not analyse her data in terms of its gendered
implications, which suggest important findings regarding women’s
access to illicit networks. For example, a female politician gained
power in her political party through her leadership in a women’s
association and continued to develop her reputation and political
network through those contacts. She gained praise, strengthening
her constituency, by distributing rice to acquaintances and political
supporters, or by securing sewing machines or vocational training for
her association members (ibid.: ). Even though women were able to
promote their reputations in this way, ‘some of them have withdrawn
from party politics as they considered it to harm their respect and
position among members’ (ibid.). Here, women’s pressure to engage in
even minuscule forms of corruption is tempered by the greater pressure
to conform to a feminine ideal. Men, by contrast, appear to engage
their clientelist relationships differently. Municipal councillors are not
salaried, yet one remains hesitant to leave his house at times because of
the burden that results when ‘some of the local women spot him . . .
expecting “a little something” like a bank-note in their hand’ (ibid.:
). Meanwhile, significant amounts of money are reserved for
infrastructure contracts. The gendered implications of these networks
are crucial. Women appear as burdensome constituents requesting
small supplies, or as politicians who are extremely careful to safeguard
their reputations and have very limited access to resources. Meanwhile,
significant sums require the complicity of political actors as well as
people working in urban infrastructure sectors, necessitating a wide
network of contacts in a field highly dominated by men.
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
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In her work on micro-finance programmes in Bangladesh, Goetz
() found that the types of illicit behaviours available to men were
very different from those available to women. Women fieldworkers
might be considered ‘local heroes’ for helping borrowers profit from
illegal cross-border trade or the misrepresentation of products. Male
fieldworkers might be able to make deals with elite men, getting
them access to loans that were ostensibly only available to the poor, or
supporting a loan for a particular political constituency in exchange
for a commission from the politician. Deals that involve establishing
contacts between different spheres of power (political, business,
industrial or rural elite) appear to be a particular site of women’s
exclusion from potentially illicit networks. Thus, in Senegalese loumas,
Perry (: ) argues that women traders are thought to ‘wait for
customers to come, while men hustle and make “arrangements”
(deals, often based on bribery) to sell their crops or livestock, or to
solicit political perks’. This is not to suggest that female traders cannot
be active in politics, figure among the rural elite, or develop profitable
business relationships. They are, however, likely to be constrained in
their strategies as they develop connections with a variety of men. Their
ability to safeguard their reputations as upstanding women is crucial to
this effort.
M A S C U L I N I T Y , C L A S S A N D R E G U L A T I O N I N I L L I C I T N E T W O R K S
The dynamics of illicit networks are structured by competing insti-
tutions, including the intersection of moral obligations and the practical
norms that adjust in response to changes in law enforcement, official
regulation and state capacity. This section illustrates how competing
norms facilitating corruption among public officials are exacerbated
by practical weaknesses in state capacity, but regulated according to
gendered ideals, impacting the accumulation strategies of men and
women as well as their justifications for illicit behaviour. For men in a
position of power, including civil servants and, to a lesser extent, drivers
who own cars, the pressure to engage in corruption is deeply connected
to notions of masculine generosity and more generalised norms of
cooperative social behaviour. The qualities that define a trader, officer
or driver as admirable or deviant illustrate ideal gender and occupation-
based identities in Senegal. None of these depends on the legality of
a practice. For officers, choosing the right time and place for strict or
flexible law enforcement is a moral obligation based on gender, class
and the responsible exercise of public authority. The drivers who help
 C Y N T H I A H O W S O N
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traders and befriend officers have some freedom in choosing whom to
befriend and how involved they want to be in smuggling. However, the
moral ground when investing simultaneously in relationships with law
enforcement and smugglers can be tricky, and drivers have to negotiate
so that everyone receives a sustainable portion of the pie.
The concept of corruption is almost universally stigmatised in Senegal
as in many parts of Africa (for extensive discussions, see Anders ;
Blundo & Olivier de Sardan ; Smith ). ‘At the everyday level,
there is scarcely a conversation without hostile or disgusted references
to corruption, either of the petty type of which one claims to have been
a victim, or the upper crust type about which one has rumours to spread’
(Olivier de Sardan : ). The contrast between people’s outrage
in the face of abstract notions of corruption, and the mechanisms that
facilitate it in practice, become clear through in-depth fieldwork
discussions of gendered social norms, moral obligations and people’s
everyday engagement with the state. Blundo () argues that corrupt
behaviour, even when it involves misappropriation of tremendous
sums of money, is very rarely subject to professional sanction, let alone
judicial investigation or imprisonment. Two customs officers recounted
a famous local example. When a former head of a customs bureau
continuously appropriated seized goods for months, the office was
investigated because the revenue targets had not been achieved, to the
dismay of the officers working there, who informally testified against
him. After intervention on his behalf, the officer not only escaped
judicial prosecution, but was not even dismissed from his post. Instead,
he was relocated to a less profitable bureau further from a border
(Officer  int.; Chef de poste  int.). Meanwhile, ‘petty corruption’
by public agents or civilian intermediaries is openly tolerated in practice
if not in conversation, by public agencies and private citizens.
Omar ( int.), a representative in the customs ministry, explained
the moral quandary that faces officers. He left his position at the Port of
Dakar, although it is known to be extremely lucrative, because the
pressure to engage in extensive corruption was oppressive. He described
the professional experience: ‘You seize someone and then you get a call
from an old teacher you haven’t seen in fifteen years, who says, “come on
now, you used to be a good student!”’ For him, any application of the
law can be associated with intense pressure from family, politicians or
marabouts. Meanwhile, his departure was met with dismay and was
difficult for people to accept. The pressure to juggle obligations when
professional and social duties interact in this way does not necessarily
provide a clear choice in a given circumstance. Moreover, these
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
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obligations are connected to the moral obligations of wealth and
masculinity to provide financially for an innumerable circle of potential
dependents. Pressure from within the organisational structure to be as
corrupt as one’s colleagues but not more so aggravates what this
officer referred to as the ‘unhealthy’ professional environment of the
bureau. As Omar’s dilemma illustrates, when faced with the obligation
to navigate the pressures of contradictory norms, the ‘border between
the legal and the illicit becomes fuzzy. It can be moved according
to circumstances, by the users of the administration as well as by the
government officials, pulled between the duties inherent in their
positions and the pressure of social, identity, and political networks’
(Blundo : ).
State regulation and involvement in illicit networks
The institutional mechanisms that facilitate corrupt behaviour in
Senegal are related to those that allow the state to function, including
the provision of basic public services. Restrictions on recruitment
and voluntary retirements from the civil service in the early s led
to a significant reduction in the size of the state. Combined with normal
retirements, this amounted to over , losses out of , total
employees (Blundo : ). Only  agents represent the entire
regional customs office of Kaolack-Fatick (ibid.), a massive geographical
terrain receiving nearly all of the illegal imports arriving from The
Gambia by land. The woefully insufficient transport infrastructure in
the region is exacerbated by a shortage of public vehicles and funds for
petrol. Meanwhile, customs officers are bound by revenue quotas and
other productivity targets that are designed to incentivise productivity,
but also motivate officers to elicit help from transporters and traders.
This may include loans of vehicles, money, or petrol as well as storage
of seized goods and information about smugglers, all of which are
financed through the illegal sale of seized goods. One officer explained
that the official regulation after a seizure is to fill out a form and send
the entirety of the seized goods to a state warehouse. In practice,
however, this is neither feasible, nor accepted. Instead, % of the
merchandise is given to each of the two officers on duty, the bureau
chief and the informant, leaving at most % of the seizure for the state
treasury. He added: ‘it’s not normal, but it has to be that way’ (Officer
 int.).
Customs officers remain in a given post for fewer than three years, an
anti-corruption measure intended to inhibit the development of social
 C Y N T H I A H O W S O N
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ties. The lack of familiarity associated with these short appointments
is mediated by help from long-term community members, who are
recruited as trackers, informants and intelligence agents (indicateurs).
One such employee explained that there are intermediaries at every
level of the customs organisation, including working in the bureau, in
charge of all movement of a seizure from confiscation to storage,
inventory, organisation and transit (Indicateur  int.). These civilian
informants are needed for their skills in navigating local terrain, both
human and physical, although it is illegal to hire them. Moreover, they
are widely criticised in local communities because they operate in secret,
illegally, and are members of the nearby village community, contesting
norms of solidarity and profiting at the expense of poor traders. Blundo
(: ) explains that ‘just like the customs officer, the informer, the
tracker or the tax collector, they are objects of avoidance and held
in contempt by the populations. The customs officer and the juuti are
cursed characters, who will go to hell (“dina nu dem safara”).’ Most
people (especially women) I spoke with were more reserved in their
moral condemnations than to use such phrases, but did not hide their
contempt.
Several informants were quick to point out that customs officers
may use the lack of administrative resources as an excuse to legitimise
their extortion of goods and services from civilians, or as a front for their
own appropriation of seized goods. Whether relationships are forged
through purely illegal economic exchange or through a practical
exchange of services, the individuals involved strengthen their relation-
ships with one another. In this way, vertical relationships characterised
by dependency or even exploitation and extortion may also be
considered patron–client relationships where affective ties and recipro-
cal obligation play a role. Moreover, administrative exchange may be a
direct means to strengthen affective ties, as in the case of officers and
transporters who emphasise that their relationships are characterised by
friendship.
Reciprocity is particularly important between motorised transporters
and customs officers. Because they own cars and cross the same border,
they are likely to cross each others’ paths frequently. An indicateur
( int.) explained that drivers working with smugglers are often ex-
traders and sometimes indicateurs as well, so that they may accept
products from a trader and then call a customs officer with the tip. One
officer indicated that drivers and officers tend to be close, and that
drivers receive significant tolerance. Those who benefit from affective
ties with officers and receive tolerance for their own illicit imports are
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
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likely to be among those who may be hired as drivers, or provide officers
with information about other smugglers. When asked if the close
relationship applied only to drivers of motorised vehicles, the officer
( int.) nodded, explaining that the horse-cart drivers’ ‘path is
suspicious’, referring to their tendency to lead officers in dangerous
chases. Similarly, when asked about friendships with customs officers, a
horse-cart driver ( int.) replied that they may know some officers,
but added, ‘douane dou xarit’, meaning ‘customs are not friends’.
Meanwhile, motorised transporters are more likely than the general
population to share experiences and to be closer in socio-economic
status to officers. This is partly because owning a car is an indication
of relative privilege and being a customs officer is an indication of
significant privilege, but also because these activities are associated with
similar degrees of mobility, contact with large numbers of people,
flexible work hours and leisure time spent away from home.
For example, an officer described his own experience of a typical
network between the customs and transport sectors, illustrating forms
of cooperation and elements of the organisational culture of the
workplace. He explained that one gendarme (military personnel typically
assigned police duties in rural areas) is posted to a customs bureau
in order to supervise the officers as an anti-corruption strategy. This
cooperation has advantages, he argues, but is a ‘total failure’ as an anti-
corruption strategy because, of course, the officers cooperate. They are
all friends with Abdou and Modou, two active drivers/smugglers from
the nearby city of Kaffrine, and a worker at the gas station who provides
petrol on credit. They cooperate with other informants. When officers
come from the Fatick customs bureau, hoping for work because their
own region is unprofitable, they are allowed to operate outside their
official jurisdiction as long as they refrain from storing seized
merchandise with village heads or taking official credit for their seizures
(Officer  int.). This arrangement may benefit officer morale
and cooperation, but it is noteworthy that these officers are allowed to
confiscate smuggled goods solely for the purpose of personal enrich-
ment.
Customs officers in rural areas are particularly affected by the
conflicted nature of their relationships. Much of their contact with
local people involves an unequal exercise of power combined with their
already tenuous reputations in the community. Because officers are
regularly transferred, traders and their allies must continue to reinvest
in these relationships and renegotiate agreements as new officers
are assigned to the area. New arrivals and especially young recruits
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are notorious for applying the law too strictly or demanding exorbitant
bribes. As they gain experience, say informants, they learn to ‘calm
down’. Because new arrivals are unfamiliar with local institutions,
everyone must be more careful when they are involved. For example,
seizures rarely happen within the confines of the louma. Should this
occur, according to the manager of Nioro louma, private negotiation
quickly follows between the trader (or a person asked to help her) and
the officer in question. If the officer is a new arrival, he will be informed
of the local ways and, typically, seized goods will be returned for a small
bribe. This is a good example of the multitude of ways in which public
authority may be exercised by a variety of people. The politically
appointed but largely powerless manager of the louma, the commanding
presence of the person chosen to lay down the law on behalf of the
trader, the police officer and the customs officer all play a role in
regulation, and the customs officer, the one person who is legally
empowered to act in the situation, becomes the enforced.
Masculinity and generosity among transporters and customs officers
Customs officers operate in murky moral territory, as the line between
corruption/theft and tolerance/reciprocity can be difficult to define.
Although corruption in general is seen pejoratively, village-based
respondents, including traders, their families and other informants,
were more critical of officers’ refusal to accept bribes than their
willingness to negotiate. Refusal to accept bribes is seen by some as
evidence of theft (that the officer intends to sell the seized merchandise
for his own benefit). Others simply felt that officers who refused bribes
were inflexible or insensitive. When officers accord ‘tolerance’ to friends
and family, it is not seen as corruption and is a moral obligation. It is
unthinkable to most of my respondents that an officer would require full
payment of dues or seize the prohibited products of a family member
(which helps to explain why flexibility tends to be accorded to the most
privileged smugglers). Tolerance justified by sympathy is seen as both
a moral good and a masculine ideal. It is understood that officers will
judge their leniency on a case by case basis considering the need of
the trader and the degree of separation between officer and trader
(whether they have a friend in common, for example). Furthermore, as
an indicateur ( int.) explained, if an officer refuses ever to show
flexibility by showing tolerance, he ‘will not end well’, but will suffer
mystically as a consequence of his actions. In this way, the social pressure
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 09 Jan 2013 IP address: 128.95.104.109
to engage in corruption may be exacerbated by officers’ desire to
prevent multiple forms of reprisal from local communities.
Because male cross-border traders and horse-cart drivers smuggle
in higher volumes than women, officers perceive them to be more
important targets for seizure. Because women trade in smaller
quantities, some officers referred to them as non-threatening and
distinguished between criminal smugglers or la fraude noire (primarily
men) and subsistence smugglers (primarily women). While accumu-
lation to ‘get rich’ was discursively linked to women’s sexuality,
accumulation as evidence of criminality was discursively linked to
masculinity. None of the women in the current sample would qualify
as criminal smugglers, whose imports are quantified by the truckload
or at least what can be held by a horse cart (ten -kg sacks of sugar,
for example). This is very likely a result of exclusion not only based
on women’s more limited access to investment capital, but also
women’s more limited access to illicit networks because of the negative
connotations associated with women’s independent wealth. Officers felt
that it was necessary, both morally and to safeguard the goodwill of the
community, to show occasional flexibility to subsistence traders who
traffic in low volumes (for instance by confiscating only half of a trader’s
goods).
Descriptions of the type of women who deserve support also indicate
the ideal masculine roles that informants define for themselves. The
ideal masculine role is represented by strength, generosity, moral
authority, discipline and the ability to provide. One driver, Dembe in
Nioro ( int.), exemplifies these characteristics in his presentation of
himself, as he tells the story of his decision to help traders. Having been
in the army, Dembe has learned discipline and respect for the law. He
considers customs officers his ‘brothers in arms’ and initially felt that
illegal cross-border trade was a crime. After having spent some time in
Nioro, however, he came to know some of the local cross-border traders
who requested his help. He sympathised with their predicament,
explaining that these are poor women, pushed by ‘social reasons’ to
engage in illegal trade, and are only trying to survive. When they asked
for his help, he was unable to refuse. Further, he is unusually able to
help because of his car and his connections to customs officers (making
it easy to negotiate a collective bribe for five women at once). He also
benefits from this exchange by strengthening his own reputation and
social network. Dembe’s sense of obligation conforms to the ideal
masculine role of a strong and generous provider, able to protect
his friends’ ideal feminine vulnerability. Of course, the women Dembe
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has chosen to help are not among the most vulnerable traders. Class
plays an important role in determining which poor women a
driver might help, in that the most vulnerable traders do not have
the opportunity to befriend Dembe. His education, relative wealth and
connection to customs officers place him in a socio-economic position
that is not accessible to those traders who are most in need of help.
Transporters typically have the luxury of choosing whether and how
much to help traders. Some horse-cart drivers provide free transport for
female traders in their families, while others charge their own wives full
price (CFA per sack of sugar, for example). The same diversity
applies to motorised transporters, implying that generosity is a moral
good, but the lack of generosity does not appear to be sanctioned.
This reflects an important popular distinction driving norms based on
solidarity. A transporter may choose to charge his family members as
paying customers because the fee represents his own personal income.
Meanwhile, a customs officer does not appear to have the same luxury
(of requiring family members to pay tariffs) because, as Olivier de
Sardan (: ) described in the case of the village infrastructure, the
funds ‘belong to the state, that is to the outside world, and therefore
to nobody’. Reciprocity is a moral obligation in Senegal, but motorised
drivers are able to choose their level of investment in particular
relationships, which gives them the freedom necessary to negotiate
whom to help and what they can expect from officers. The inability of
horse-cart drivers to make the same choices is a reflection of the
limitations of class and geography in their social access to officers.
S E X U A L I T Y , R E P U T A T I O N A N D W O M E N ’ S M A R G I N
O F M A N O E U V R A B I L I T Y
Gendered access to illicit networks is distinctly reflected in the way
traders depend on collaboration with men, and state actors in particular,
throughout the process of supply acquisition, transit and sales. Men
facilitate access to transport networks in collaboration with customs
officers, other transport networks in the evasion of customs officers,
and negotiation in the event of seizure, thereby exercising control
over women’s opportunities. These relationships intersect with those
in which male suppliers provide credit and male kin provide moral
support, giving women permission to trade. Access to opportunities
for illicit accumulation thus depends on men’s support in a way that
conditions women’s margin of manoeuvrability in pushing the bound-
aries of gender norms.
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For women, the key determinants of acceptable behaviour are greed
and sexuality. This section begins by elucidating the role of sexuality as
a strategy of male dominance impacting women’s behaviour. Next, the
strategies of the most successful traders highlight the importance of class
in women’s access to opportunities for corrupt accumulation. Ironically,
it is the wealthiest women who are able to use feminine poverty and
vulnerability to obtain consistent help. However, some women success-
fully challenge the boundaries of ideal femininity because they
command significant economic and social resources.
Importantly, most traders I spoke with (%) are never able to receive
‘tolerance’ (negotiation upon seizure) or even successfully bribe
customs officers. This is true of ·% of the poorest women (all but
two), and ·% of the wealthiest traders. Within the bottom two
wealth quintiles, four women have successfully kept some portion of
their products through a bribe, without necessarily benefiting from help
(bribes ranged from % to % of the value of their products).
Meanwhile, it is among the wealthiest group of traders that diverse
strategies of law-avoidance begin to appear: three who travel to Banjul
and successfully hide their products or negotiate tariff reductions;
several who have established relationships involving the complicity of
customs officers; and those who benefit from the help of well-connected
transporters. It is worth noting here that class is apparent in the sample
in ways that are occasionally quite subtle. However, these examples
reflect glaring differences in power, including quantifiable access to
durable assets (defined here as ‘wealth’), as well as qualitative evidence
of well-being and power (education, health, market power and
connections to powerful men).
Sexuality and gendered expectations
The most commonly cited criticism of women’s involvement in illegal
cross-border trade is the risk of adultery or prostitution. It is common
knowledge that some women have relationships with customs officers,
thereby receiving tolerance and other forms of support, although there
is very little empirical evidence that the practice is widespread or
available to women who are not wealthy and well connected. Meanwhile,
men who criticise women’s smuggling point out that young and
attractive women are more successful. Interestingly, this topic was only
mentioned by relatively wealthy, urban informants. Although the topic
itself is taboo, it is also likely that class and geography play important
roles in determining officers’ relationships, so that poorer traders
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and village-based traders are less likely to establish social ties to officers.
This is why the moral pressure to engage in corruption tends to be
concentrated in the wealthiest circles. Officers who are based near the
border often rent a flat in the better equipped town of Wack in order to
be less conspicuous and more comfortable, so their daily interactions
with rural smugglers are rarely social. Meanwhile, the fourteen traders
who are able to successfully evade seizure are over one quintile wealthier
than the average trader, and all fall within the most successful quintile in
terms of trading capital. Seven of them are from the town of Nioro.
One driver, Dembe ( int.), explained that illegal trade was
morally risky. When asked what morals were at risk, he described young,
seductive women who risked becoming promiscuous, explaining that
there is a ‘veiled competition between neighbours, between rich and
poor’. The implied relationship between promiscuity and competition
among traders illustrates the tenuousness of women’s reputations
and the complexity of adhering to a feminine ideal. This is reminiscent
of Perry’s (: ) finding that men in loumas ‘link economic
liberalization and market activity to sexual liberty and immorality. Men
deride petty trade by conflating it with female sexuality.’ Here,
competitiveness is a trait not conforming to the feminine ideal,
particularly as it relates to class antagonism. ‘Getting rich’ as a motive
for women’s smuggling was cited by several informants as an inherent
moral pejorative and a dangerous precedent. Women who become
wealthy in trade may ‘just want their freedom’ rather than simply
seeking ‘household maintenance’. For this reason, women’s ability to
protect the image of altruistic motives for income generation appears
to be an important determinant of labour participation. The alternative
of ‘wanting one’s freedom’ refers to financial independence from
one’s husband and is related to the concern that cross-border trade will
increase divorce rates. As an example, Dembe cited a particular case in
which a metalworker was less wealthy than his wife and she divorced
him. It is worth noting that, although several accounts of divorce in the
sample were related to financial issues, there is no case of divorce that
occurred after a woman became successful in trade, and there are very
few cases in which the trader appears to be financially better off than her
husband.
The role of sexuality in obtaining support from officers is not limited
to sexual relationships. The observation that young and attractive
women are more likely to get tolerance was cited by several men as
evidence for a variety of conclusions, including that married women
should not smuggle, that unmarried women should not smuggle, and
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 09 Jan 2013 IP address: 128.95.104.109
as an indication that sex for favours is common among traders.
Importantly, this is not true of most men I spoke with. A large majority
of male respondents described smuggling as an economic necessity
for women in general. Several male informants explained that border
villages lack industry or employment opportunities, and women have a
budgetary responsibility that is difficult to fulfil. In villages, most
respondents did not see a moral downside to smuggling, but explained
the primary disadvantage as the risk of seizure. Even among rural
informants who were hesitant about smuggling, illegality never
appeared as part of a moral discourse. On the other hand, informants
in the larger town of Nioro (a shop-owner, a driver and an officer) felt
that smuggling was only acceptable for women who were otherwise
unable to fulfil their household responsibilities, and each of them
referenced sexuality as the reason.
That sexuality is a factor (be it in the form of sexual relationships or
women simply benefiting from their attractiveness) in the trader–officer
relationship was mentioned by several men and no women. In part, this
is because the entire discourse reflects poorly on women, but also
because the assertion is a tool of male dominance, used precisely
because it is the most effective way to denigrate women’s activities. The
tendency of male informants to associate smuggling with sexuality
reflects more than the concern about actual sexual behaviour. For some
men, women’s skill and involvement in revenue-generating activities is
linked to their sexuality. As one man noted in a study of loumas, ‘women
are better sellers than men since women have more charm (bayre)’
(Perry : ). Women’s power is thus discursively linked to their
sexual allure. As a moral issue, whenever sexuality was mentioned, the
discourse was pejorative (including words like ‘inappropriate’, ‘risky’,
‘dangerous’ or ‘adultery’) only as it related to women or their husbands
(who are responsible for allowing them to trade). Sexuality for officers,
however, seems to be morally neutral territory as it was only referenced
as a fact.
Manipulating femininity
Investing in an effective support network for illicit accumulation
requires cultivating the kind of reputation that makes one seem worthy
of help. Some of the more effective traders emphasised their femininity
in particular relationships, further illustrating ideal feminine roles. The
most successful strategy involves prior negotiation with a customs officer,
a practice that effectively prevents the risk of seizure (with a manageable
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bribe) and seems to be distinctly connected to an ability to represent
ideal feminine roles. In most cases, ‘cultivating femininity’ involved
proactively showing deference to one’s husband, or describing the
ways in which one’s husband is a good provider and is supportive of
her activities. Several successful (and wealthy) women are heavily
involved in volunteer activities or those associated with health or
education, and describe their activities in terms of solidarity. This is
in distinct contrast to the majority of traders who rarely mentioned
their husbands, except in response to questions about them. Most
traders appeared to be preoccupied with matters of practical necessity.
One successful woman from Nioro, Amie, explained that she began
trading when her husband lost a high-paying job with an NGO in .
Because he had always been an excellent provider and had never denied
her the things she needed, it was important for her to do everything she
could to keep the family afloat when he was laid off. For start-up capital,
he gave her the CFA, severance package from the NGO. This
tone incorporates several facets of the ideal gender roles in Senegal. Not
only does she show deference to her husband, but she protects the
image of his masculinity by portraying him as the consummate provider.
In order to provide for her family, she began gardening, baking cakes
to sell as well as cross-border trading. Amie’s case is exceptional, in that
she is one of only three women to have received help from their
husbands to begin trading. This is the only example of such a
substantial portion of a husband’s own capital, and was a much larger
gift than other women received from anybody. Only one trader in the
sample began with more, at CFA,, and her brother was a customs
officer in Farafenni.
When Amie began cross-border trading, she went first to the customs
bureau at Farafenni to explain her predicament. Because her husband
was laid off, she was forced to earn as much as possible (implying she
had to provide more than would typically be expected of a wife). Officers
were sensitive to her problem and allowed her to buy a particular
quantity of banned goods. As a strategy, this was especially effective
because her tolerance was negotiated before she purchased her
supplies, protecting her from seizure. When discussing time away from
home, she is unusually careful to point out the importance of being
available for her children. She is humble and charismatic, seeming
neither to complain nor to martyr herself. She thus appears a
consummate wife and mother, made vulnerable by a circumstance
beyond her control, having no choice but to engage in illegal trade. This
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approach is so effective that she is almost never categorically denied
tolerance (although the amount she is allowed to buy has varied).
What is telling about Amie’s experience is that she established
relationships with customs officers ostensibly on the basis of a financial
crisis beyond her control, exaggerating her vulnerability and skilfully
displaying her femininity, to such an extent that this explanation
(her husband having been laid off) continued to be effective for the rest
of her career, the twenty-one years she had been trading before the
current survey. Meanwhile, in reality she is an innovative and intelligent
businesswoman, with significant financial and social resources available
to her, and is very independent from her husband. Her husband was
present at every occasion I visited her. They appear to have an extremely
affectionate relationship, but her husband did not exert his authority
overtly. Moreover, she was one of very few women to travel to the Gambia
in the evening, a particular measure of independence because others
may associate it with an opportunity to engage in romantic liaisons with
officers. It is also, of course, an opportunity to sell and garden more
actively and be with her children during the day, but the fact that her
husband was not critical of this behaviour is indicative of their non-
traditional roles. She is, by any standard, one of the least vulnerable
women in the sample.
A remarkably similar strategy is equally effective for Fatou, whose
vulnerability stems from a physical disability. This case is reminiscent of
similar findings in Congo, where disabled women as a group are granted
flexibility from customs officers (Devlieger et al. ). Fatou, a wealthy
and well-educated trader, has been the main contributor to her
household since her father died in . Her husband (a metalworker
turned ‘politician’) lives elsewhere, but visits and contributes financially.
In addition to cross-border trade, she sells snacks and teaches adult
literacy. Her multiple income sources allowed her to begin trading with
CFA,, a sum surpassed by only five traders in the sample, of whom
only two earned the sum independently. She is able to obtain formal
credit (where interest rates are lower) and trade with significant mobility
in Mauritania, Dakar and Banjul. She credits expansion in her trade to
business skills she acquired in a management course. Her ability to
engender compassion on the part of customs officers is based on a
physical disability. When she was four years old, she fell from a significant
height and grew up with a noticeable limp. She walks slowly but does not
otherwise suffer from limited mobility. Because she has a disability, she
explains that customs officers pity her and are willing to give her
tolerance, which she negotiates prior to purchasing her supplies.
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These women have been able to curry favour with local customs
officers ostensibly as a result of vulnerability beyond their control.
However, the resources on which they draw to obtain this support (start-
up capital, management skills, convenient transport, credit) were
available precisely because they were not comparatively vulnerable at
all. Indeed, the strategy of prior negotiation is extremely rare, for several
reasons. First, it is only possible for women who are able to engender
some element of affection from officers. There are good reasons to
imagine that this may be mediated by class in the same way as other
social investments. Second, it requires a degree of autonomy from one’s
husband not enjoyed by all women. The decision to approach a customs
officer in advance and seek assistance is precisely the kind of behaviour
that is attached to rumours of sexual impropriety. Third, this
opportunity is only possible for women who have physical access to a
customs facility.
Alternatives to feminine vulnerability
For traders with significant resources, prior negotiation is not the only
successful strategy to gain the complicity of law enforcement, nor is
conforming to a feminine ideal. Mariam benefits from a wide margin of
manoeuvrability because her husband used to be a customs officer.
Because he transports her products for her, she never has to worry about
seizure. Moreover, she is less obligated than most traders to invest in
solidarity with customers. While nearly all traders provide products on
credit, most emphasised the need to respond with diplomacy or
understanding to those who are unable to pay. This reflects a similar
strategy for success to that described by Ntseane () in Botswana.
There, traders were obligated to invest in business relations by exhibiting
characteristically feminine traits, promoting solidarity and cooperation,
without appearing competitive. Mariam, on the other hand, uses her
contacts within the gendarmerie to intimidate customers into paying back
their loans, an approach that would be neither effective nor appropriate
for other women, even among those familiar with gendarmes.
Adama reflects an atypical level of success for a woman, almost single-
handedly providing the household income that puts her within the
wealthiest quintile. She has been engaged in cross-border trade for
twenty years, having established a wide network of contacts and a
significant store of capital. Her husband does not appear to contribute
to the household income as they have no land and he has limited vision.
He describes her contribution as ‘exemplary’. Because she is friendly
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with several customs officers in the region, and provides them with loans
when they lack resources in the field, she often has the opportunity to
purchase seized goods. She also claims to benefit from the regulations
limiting direct seizure by indicateurs. During our interview, whenever her
husband spoke, or my research assistant spoke to me in French, she
slept. When a visitor came to see her, she told her husband to lie and say
she was not at home. Although my research assistant typically refrained
from commenting on the responses and behaviour of respondents, in
this case, he felt compelled to evaluate the marriage, reflecting many
of the gendered moral norms described above. He explained that
in some marriages, when a wife is more financially secure than her
husband, she is able to ‘torture’ her husband. He is obliged to
compliment her (describing her as an exemplary wife) and lie for her
(a particularly egregious sin in Senegal), because she controls the
household income.
Whether traders exaggerate their femininity in order to curry favour
or push the boundaries of gender norms, the social resources that
lead to success for a trader involve fulfilling the right identities at the
right time, and investing in the right relationships with the most well-
connected people. These strategies are rarely available to the poorest
women.
: : :
This paper has investigated the role of illicit networks in facilitating
corruption and successful law-avoidance among cross-border traders. It
contributes to a little-studied area of scholarship regarding gendered
aspects of corruption, arguing that understanding this relationship
requires an analysis of the practical dynamics of corrupt behaviour
and the role of gendered social norms in structuring access to illicit
networks. By examining the way in which men and women invest in and
compete for access to these networks, it shows some of the ways in which
corruption impacts men and women differently and, particularly, ways
in which gender mediates opportunities for corrupt accumulation in
Senegal. Access to these networks is distinctly gendered, for a variety of
reasons, including patterns in labour participation, access to associa-
tional and political networks, and social norms that criticise women’s
wealth and conflate accumulation with sexual impropriety. Despite a
discourse of generosity and solidarity associated with these networks,
opportunities for corruption are mediated by class and gender in a way
that favours social differentiation, particularly in so far as they depend
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on geographic and socio-economic affinity with customs officers and
well-connected transporters. Although women’s illicit enterprise is likely
to be constrained in important ways, this may result more from their
reputation among men, than from their own moral values.
The institutions that regulate illicit networks include gendered moral
obligations as well as practical norms that adjust in response to changes
in law enforcement and state capacity. Issues of organisational culture,
occupational identity and interpersonal negotiations of power represent
important sources of corruption that require an understanding of
the actual dynamics of public administration. While limitations in the
resources of the state necessitate the use of some auxiliary bureaucrats,
officials also use affective or economic networks as part of strategies for
personal accumulation or investment in community solidarity. The
dynamics of these networks in structuring accumulation strategies and
facilitating corruption in the customs apparatus are far more compli-
cated than the literature on corruption and governance implies. Indeed,
the fundamental difference between donors’ understanding of corrup-
tion and its popular representation in Senegal is an important factor
in the unwillingness and inability of citizens to hold leaders accountable
for specific corrupt behaviours, reflecting the analytical limitation of
‘good governance’ as an approach to anti-corruption strategies.
N O T E S
. ‘Practical norms’ refer to the intersections and divergence between official regulations and
social norms that characterise professional practice and ‘real governance’. See Olivier de Sardan
 for elaboration of this concept. See Titeca & De Herdt  for a study of practical norms
regulating smuggling and corruption in Uganda.
. The survey sought to identify the determinants of labour participation and success among
cross-border traders, and included extensive research on topics beyond the scope of the current
paper (including life experiences with marriage, reproduction, education, health and occupation).
The sample includes women cross-border traders selling daily commodities that are typically
smuggled in any of five loumas (periodic markets) near the Gambian border. Louma villages were
selected in an effort to maximise variation (village population, distance to an official border point,
size and relative importance of the markets). After an initial familiarisation in ten loumas in Senegal
and The Gambia, focus groups in the five sampled villages helped to identify key concerns of traders
and village residents, and to provide an approximate sample frame. Individual traders were then
sampled randomly, where possible, and purposively when necessary to maximise variation between
women (especially with respect to age, relative wealth, marital status, membership in women’s
organisations, means of transport and experience trading). Four life histories helped to contextualise
and triangulate fieldwork data.
. To hold a privileged class position in the current paper is to be in a position of power, able to
command economic and social resources in comparison with others in the community.
. The bureau chief or chef de poste in Keur Ayib (.. int.) indicated such intervention is
common, but did not know who, in particular, had protected the officer in this situation. When asked
he answered in English: ‘Who knows? Other customs officers, marabouts, family.’
. For numerical data, ‘wealth’ refers to quintiles calculated through an asset index using
principal components analysis based on access to durable goods for the sample of one hundred
G E N D E R A N D C O R R U P T I O N I N S E N E G A L
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 09 Jan 2013 IP address: 128.95.104.109
cross-border traders. This approach follows Filmer & Pritchett , and is comparable
to the method used in the Demographic and Health Survey in Senegal. ‘Class’ refers to a
combination of wealth, as defined by the index, and qualitative evidence of relative power and well-
being.
. Unlike discourses associated with sexuality, greed and competition are also prime targets of
women’s condemnation of other women.
. This behaviour is very rarely described as ‘prostitution’, indicating that the moral assessment of
such a relationship, while not positive, is not as harshly viewed as prostitution.
. References to ‘border villages’ indicate that proximity to the border is a distinctly identifying
feature of the community, rather than that underemployment is a distinct phenomenon of border
villages.
. Informants whom I describe as ‘hesitant about smuggling’ include a son who campaigned to
stop his elderly mother from trading, and a village head whose village had decided not to engage in
smuggling because they were often witness to seizures.
. The lack of financial assistance from husbands is noteworthy, as % received gifts from family
members. It is also somewhat unusual in West Africa (cf. Guérin ; Meagher ).
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Interviews
Chef de poste, Customs, Keur Ayib, Kaolack Region, ...
Dembe, driver, Nioro, Kaolack Region, ...
Horse-cart driver, Kaolack Region, ...
Indicateur, Kaolack city, ...
Officer, Customs field office, Kaolack Region, ...
Omar, Ministry of Customs, Dakar, ...
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